Showing posts with label credit crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label credit crisis. Show all posts

The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life Review

The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life
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The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life Review
I recently re-read Roger Lowenstein's biography, Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist (first published in 1995 and now re-issued with a new Afterword), and then read this more recent one by Alice Schroeder. Both are first-rate. Which to select if reading only one? That depends on how much you wish to know about Buffett's personal life, including his relations with various family members, and how curious you are about his personal hang-ups, peculiarities, eccentricities, fetishes, etc. If you can do without any of that, Roger Lowenstein's biography is the one to read. I also highly recommend the recently published Second Edition of The Essays of Warren Buffet: Lessons for Corporate America, with content selected, arranged, and introduced by Lawrence Cunningham.
The heft of Schroeder's biography may discourage some people from obtaining a copy. To them I presume to suggest that they not be deterred by that factor. Schroeder has a lively, often entertaining writing style that drives the narrative through just about every period and (yes) interlude of Warren Buffett's life and career thus far. There is much more information provided than most readers either need or desire. However, she had unprecedented access not only to Buffett but to just about everyone else with whom he is (or once was) associated as well as to previously inaccessible research resources. It is possible but highly unlikely that anyone else will write a more comprehensive biography than Schroeder has, at least for the next several years, if not decades. Also, her opinion of Buffett seems to me to be balanced and circumspect. No doubt he wishes that certain details about his life and career were not included. However, there has been no indication from him or those authorized to represent him that any of the material in this biography (however unflattering) is either inaccurate or unfair. Both halos and warts are included.
Others have shared their reasons for holding this book in high regard. Here are two of mine. First, although I had already read various Buffett's chairman's letters that first appeared in a series of Berkshire Hathaway's annual reports, I did not understand (nor could I have understood) the context for observations he shared, especially his comments about especially important 12-month periods throughout BRK's history. Schroeder provides the context or frame-of-reference I needed but previously lacked. For example, whereas in previous letters, Buffett merely offered brief updates on how each BRK company was doing, in 1978 he began to share his thoughts about major business topics such as performance measurement for management and why short-term earnings were a poor criterion for investment decisions. With the help of Carol Loomis, especially since 1977, his chairman's letters "had grown more personal and entertaining by the year; they amounted to crash courses in business, written in clear language that ranged from biblical quotations to references to Alice in Wonderland, and princesses kissing toads." As Schroeder explains, these gradual but significant changes of subject and tone reflect changes in Buffett's personal life as he became more reflective about business principles and more appreciative of personal relationships. His children were growing up and departing the "nest" in Omaha. His wife Susie decided to relocate to San Francisco. Meanwhile, his personal net worth continued to increase substantially. His national and then international recognition also increased. The "Oracle of Omaha" had finally become sufficiently confident of himself to reveal to others "a sense of him as a man."
I also appreciate how carefully Schroeder develops several separate but related themes that help her reader to manage the wealth of information she provides. The biography's title suggests one of these themes: the "snowball" effect that compounded interest can have. From childhood when he began to sell packs of gum (but not single sticks) and bottles of soda, and a money changer was his favorite toy, Buffett was fascinated by the way that numbers "exploded as they grew at a constant rate over time was how a small sum could be turned into a fortune. He could picture the numbers compounding as vividly as the way a snowball grew when he rolled it across the lawn. Warren began to think about it a different way. Compounding married the present to the future. If a dollar today was going to be worth ten some years from now, then in his mind the two were the same." Early in life, Buffett avoided making any purchases unless they were almost certain to generate compound interest. This theme is central to understanding Buffett's investment principles and to his own leadership of BRK. It also helps to explain why he could become physically ill when an investment cost others the funds they had entrusted to his care. Other themes include his determination to simplify his life to the extent he could (e.g. eating hamburgers and wearing threadbare sweaters, minimizing participation in family activities) so that he could concentrate almost entirely on business matters; his dependence on a series of women, beginning with his mother and two sisters (especially Doris) that continued with his first wife Susie (and their daughter "Susie Jr.") and then companion Astrid Menks whom he married in 2006; and his passion for helping others to understand the business principles to which he has been committed since childhood.
There is one other theme of special interest and importance to me: over the years, how Buffett has interacted with various associates, notably with Jerome Newman and Benjamin Graham, Sandy Gottesman, Charlie Munger, Bill Ruane, Katherine Graham, and Bill Gates. By all accounts, Buffett is a superb business associate once he agrees to become involved. He cares deeply about each relationship, does whatever may be necessary to protect and defend the best interests of his associates, and is extraordinarily generous with material rewards as well as recognition. Here is an especially revealing excerpt from Cunningham's Introduction to The Essays of Warren Buffett: "The CEOs at Berkshire's operating companies enjoy a unique position in corporate America. They are given a simple set of commands: to run the business as if (1) they are its sole owner, (2) it is the only asset they hold, and (3) they can never sell or merge it for one hundred years." These three "commands" are wholly consistent with what Lawrence explains earlier in the same Introduction: "The central theme uniting Buffett's lucid essays is that the principles of fundamental business analysis, first formulated by his teachers Ben Graham and David Dodd, should guide investment practice. Linked to that theme are management principles that define the proper role of corporate managers as the stewards of investment capital and the proper role of shareholders as the suppliers and owners of capital. Radiating from these main themes are practical and sensible lessons on the entire range of important business issues, from accounting to mergers to valuation." Those who shared Buffett's same core values of honesty and integrity, and who are also committed to the same basic principles, cherish their relationship with him.
To me, Alice Schroeder's rigorous and eloquent analysis of this theme of mutually productive and beneficial collaboration is her single greatest achievement among many in this definitive biography of one of the most important and yet least understood business leaders in recent years. Bravo!The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life Overview

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The Quants: How a New Breed of Math Whizzes Conquered Wall Street and Nearly Destroyed It Review

The Quants: How a New Breed of Math Whizzes Conquered Wall Street and Nearly Destroyed It
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The Quants: How a New Breed of Math Whizzes Conquered Wall Street and Nearly Destroyed It ReviewScott Patterson's _The Quants_ was thoroughly terrible. Patterson manages to make a dizzying array (to borrow a term he overuses) of errors, packaged in a mass of hyperbolae and confused statements.
It had a few good qualities, which I'll start with. It was pretty entertaining, especially the first half, and it was a quick and easy read. It also had some interesting bits that don't appear in other books (that I'm aware of): the "second forty hours" at Renaissance and the description of AQR deciding to go back into the markets on the Friday just after the quant liquidation in August 2007. Finally, I applaud the message that risk management policies based on the normal distribution can be deeply pernicious. But the problems with this book were monumental.
The first problem with Patterson's book is that it's wrong at its core. Quant traders weren't guilty of causing the credit crisis. Some of them were victimized by it (when Lehman went bust, it took with it a bunch of money belonging to some very good, honest, and hardworking quant traders that were Lehman's prime brokerage clients). It's foolish to claim that market neutral trading, CTAs, and high frequency traders were somehow responsible for investment banks' over-leveraged, toxic balance sheets. The responsibility for this falls squarely on the shoulders of banks' managers, and perhaps also on the shoulders of free-market disciples who believe, despite all the evidence throughout history to the contrary, that regulation of human behavior is bad. The crime in this is that it dramatically changes the focus from the real source of the problem that nearly buckled our economic system--namely unchecked greed, incompetent or impotent risk managers, screwed up incentive structures, and misguided regulation--to a group of traders that people are naturally inclined to hate anyway. If Patterson's disingenuous take on the credit crisis is widely adopted, it will make for a very convenient scapegoat enabling greedy, ego-hungry Goldman Sachs execs once again to make the very same kinds of bets that (at least nearly) brought them down to begin with. Did these execs use statistics to justify their position? Sure. But to make it sound like quants are somehow responsible for the stupidity or greed of their bosses who didn't (want to?) understand the weaknesses of a model is moronic.
Another fundamental problem with this book was the arbitrariness of Patterson's use of the label "quant." Whenever it was convenient (when it sounded evil), he labeled or insinuated the activity as being quant. But math is used pretty much everywhere in finance, and it always has been. Patterson:
-Treats the computation of a price-to-book ratio (P/B) as "value investing" but taking the difference in two interest rates (X minus Y) as a "quant carry trade". Why is subtraction "quant" and division "value"? Patterson also ignores the fact that the bulk of carry trading is done by discretionary traders, such as those in the global macro space.
-Confuses financial engineers, derivatives experts employed by the sell-side investment banks to create products like Principal Guaranteed Notes, Collateralized Debt Obligations, and compute VaR with buy-side quant trading outfits that are simply speculating their own, or their clients', capital in the markets alongside everyone else.
-Calls the belief that investors are rational a "quant theory," which is stupid. It's a basic tenet of economics and not a premise of quant trading.
-Treats the efficient market hypothesis as central to quants. By definition, quant traders believe the market is at least somewhat inefficient.
-Refers to capital structure arbitrage and distressed debt trading, respectively, as a though they are quant strategies. They're not. Cap structure arb is at the intersection of legal and accounting expertise. Deciding to buy a bunch of toxic assets from a company to which you already have lots of exposure (E*Trade) is not a quant trade either.
-Equates the move by banks to take huge risk off their balance sheets through tricky accounting practices with quants.
-Somehow treats Jerome Kerveil's very plain vanilla long equity futures trade as a "complex derivatives trade," which (for the author) puts it under the heading of quant. This was a fully discretionary trade that moved markets down by 8-9% as it was unwound.
Saving the worst for last...Patterson writes: "The quants were killing Bear Stearns." This is so foolish that it should make anyone with half a brain question his integrity. Because two funds with quant trading activities withdrew their funds' capital from a brokerage house rumored to be on the brink of failing, they are somehow quants killing a bank? Are the quants who trusted Lehman (and had their money evaporate as a result) called martyrs for the cause of our financial system because they kept their capital there too long? Is it a quant model that is responsible for the manager of a fund deciding it was a matter of common sense and fiduciary responsibility to move his cash to a safer haven? What kind of nonsense is Patterson trying to peddle here? This kind of arbitrary labeling is helpful for his rhetoric, but it's also garbage. In reality, quants are no better or worse citizens of humanity than George Soros (who was responsible for breaking the Bank of England in 1992 and maybe for bringing Asian economies to the brink of collapse in 1997) or Warren Buffett.
My second problem with this book is that it is poorly written. It is full of confused statements and errors. Patterson:
-calls diversification "quant magic" (p. 180)... what the hell?
-mistakenly refers to buying credit default swaps when in fact the transaction described is a sale, carrying this mental midgetry throughout the rest of the example and drawing wrong conclusions from it (pages 189-191).
-claims that "virtually the entire quant community...embraced the derivatives explosion wholeheartedly," (p. 192) which is pretty much the opposite of correct. The derivatives explosion also resulted in the widespread selling of volatility by banks, which itself was no small pain in the neck for quants (and other trading-oriented alpha-seekers).
-claims that the August 2007 quant liquidation was "making a hash of (mom-and-pop investors') 401(k)s and mutual funds." (p. 230) The quants that liquidated in August 2007 were market neutral. This means they held roughly equal quantities of long and short positions, and that they liquidated roughly equal quantities of long and short positions. The S&P was basically flat through this crisis, meaning that no one's 401(k) was being hashed.
The style of the writing reminded me of a cross between the National Enquirer and a Batman comic. Every one of the following phrases appears in this book, many more than once, and some countless dozens of times: "nerd king," "math whiz," "math wizard," "value king," "whiz-bang," "crack team," "it was nuts," and "whiz kid." Patterson also continuously used overwrought, mixed and confused metaphors, such as: "churning wheels of the Money Grid," and later, "tentacles of the Money Grid." On p. 197, he claims that the carry trade was a "frictionless digital push-button cash machine based on math and computers--a veritable quant fantasyland of riches." This horrible abuse of the English language is also hyperbolic nonsense. On p. 270, he likens investors in 2008 to "frightened children in a haunted house," a trivializing and wholly inappropriate description. On p. 273, a nonsense sentence appears: "...its hedge funds held about $140 billion in gross assets on $15 billion in capital, or the stuff it actually owned." He climaxed on p. 307, with this gem: "Lo's view of the market was more like a drum-pounding heavy metal concert of dueling forces that compete for power in a Darwinian death dance." That, I think, sums it up. I'd say I was disappointed that the press has adopted Patterson's deeply flawed views wholesale, but in reality, I guess I didn't expect any better.
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Counterparty Credit Risk: The new challenge for global financial markets (The Wiley Finance Series) Review

Counterparty Credit Risk: The new challenge for global financial markets (The Wiley Finance Series)
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Counterparty Credit Risk: The new challenge for global financial markets (The Wiley Finance Series) ReviewI found this review of CVA/BCVA computation very thorough and well structured. Due to lack of a complet text that covers this new area, Jon's new book should be helpful to the uninitiated. I fast-tracked to Chapter 4 :). Overall, not difficult to understand, and develops good intuition into CVA modelling.Counterparty Credit Risk: The new challenge for global financial markets (The Wiley Finance Series) Overview

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Endgame: The End of the Debt Supercycle and How It Changes Everything Review

Endgame: The End of the Debt Supercycle and How It Changes Everything
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Endgame: The End of the Debt Supercycle and How It Changes Everything ReviewJohn Mauldin and Jonathan Tepper clearly set the stage for how to invest and profit from what they call the "Endgame." The Endgame follows the "Debt Supercycle." The debt supercycle refers to the unsustainable rise of debt over a period of 60+ years mostly in the private sector of the developed world that culminated into the global financial crisis that erupted in 2007-08 (pp. 8; 12; 15; 25; 40; 108). The endgame points to a crisis in the public sector debt, which (will) occur when (Western) governments run into the limits of their ability to borrow money at today's low rates (p. 25).
The transition from the debt supercycle to the endgame is characterized, for the most part, by a transfer of debt, not an extinction of it, from the private sector to the public sector (pp. 24-25). Western governments and central banks have run large fiscal deficits and printed massive amounts of money to reduce the impact of the multiyear balance sheet recession in the private sector (pp. 8; 13; 24-25; 29; 58-63; 98-104; 136-141; 155; 158; 172-174; 227; 230; 252; 267-272). To their credit, Mauldin and Tepper clearly explain why deficits matter. Unfortunately, countries like the United States have mostly not run surplus and pay down debt in good times so that there is room for a policy response in bad times (pp. 54-57; 178-180; 188-196; 224; 235; 249). Unless central banks print money, the financing of large government debt runs the risk of crowding out business investment that relies on savings of consumers and businesses (pp. 53; 121-122).
Mauldin and Tepper are not surprised at all about this policy of kicking the proverbial can down the road that will result into greater systemic instability with more macroeconomic volatility and greater variability of inflation rates (pp. 29; 34-44; 73-89; 154; 240; 254; 271). Most politicians in the developed economies have a hard time to address any long-term problem because most voters prefer to opt out of a long-term gain if a short-term pain is required (pp. 3; 7; 118; 129; 182; 188; 218; 238). The authors warn public decision-makers and their respective electorate that the longer hard decisions are put off, the more pain their country, state, or city will have to ultimately endure (pp. 6; 89; 92; 100; 155-156; 219; 226; 239; 245; 253-259). Like the private sector, the public sector will be hold accountable for trying to borrow its way out of a debt crisis (pp. 41; 55-56; 100; 259).
Mauldin and Tepper recommend that:
1. Americans reduce their personal leverage and save more. Policy makers have relied on debt and income transfers to mask the fact that low-end wages have become too high under the relentless pressure of globalization;
2. The U.S. economy shift from consumption, real estate, and finance toward manufacturing to start addressing the structural decline in its civilian participation rate. Germany has been thriving because the world has been buying its goods;
3. The United States put in place more tax policies to encourage new businesses and therefore new jobs;
4. The United States restructure Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security thoroughly. No reasonably foreseeable rate of economic growth will overcome the structural deficit associated with these three major programs. Otherwise, a substantial value added tax will be needed to cover the cost and result into even slower growth;
5. The United States, its states, and its cities revisit the total remuneration package of their respective workforce. The status quo is unsustainable;
6. The United States take a cue from Canada by giving a higher priority to legal immigrants with degrees and money for a few years;
7. The U.S. economy reduce its over-dependence on foreign oil through steep taxation on gasoline to make alternatives more competitive that they are today. The tax burden in the United States is low compared to other countries around the world;
8. The United States use some of the proceeds, of a significantly higher taxation, on gasoline to fix its infrastructure, which is badly in need of repair;
9. The United States get serious about the much-touted nuclear renaissance by approving the building of a large number of new reactors (pp. 67-69; 85-86; 88-89; 118-119; 124-125; 137; 160; 167-169; 181-214; 243-244).
Mauldin and Tepper point out that there is no way to know in advance when bondholders will suddenly lose confidence in the ability of a government to pay its debt, even if that debt is denominated in a currency that the government can print (pp. 13-14; 32; 54-55; 57; 94-98; 125-127; 186-188; 259; 263; 279-281). When countries have too much debt, they usually inflate away excessive debt. Devaluation and default on debt are the two other options available to over-indebted countries (pp. 25; 110; 122-125; 128-131; 158; 180; 200; 229). To compensate for this higher perceived risk, bondholders will press for a rise in interest rates, which will further debilitate the capacity of a country to refund its debt (pp. 55; 105; 123; 231). A program of austerity becomes a necessity to bring the debt back to acceptable levels and to reinvigorate the confidence of bondholders (pp. 12; 154). Without the precarious and fickle confidence of bondholders, the ability to roll over (large) debt, especially short-term one, or borrow new debt at affordable rates, crumbles concomitantly with the liquidity of the financial markets and the economy (pp. 94; 96; 278).
Although Mauldin and Tepper do not offer any practical investment advice, they give a non-exhaustive list of possible investments to consider if one believes in either deflation and/or inflation (pp. 284-292; 294-296). The authors believe that deflation will precede inflation (pp. 133; 295). Mauldin and Tepper have a low confidence in the ability of Western central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, to appropriately transition their respective economies from a deflationary era to one of controlled inflation. Therefore, timing will be critical to capitalize on an era of increasing volatility (p. 296).
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Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism Review

Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism
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Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism ReviewThe book consists of roughly two parts. The first is the philosophical foundation of the "theory of reflexivity", with application to financial markets and historical process in general, resulting in the "Open Society" concept. The second is the assessment of the present moment of history and the author's vision of the future of the global financial and political architecture.
The "reflexivity theory", already developed by George Soros in his earlier books (e.g. "The Alchemy of Finance") can be summed up in his own words: "We are part of the world we seek to understand, and our imperfect understanding plays an important role in shaping the events in which we participate." This entails recognition of the fundamental limitations of the social science and our own understanding of society. "It (reflexivity) creates a cleavage between the natural and social sciences and it undermines the postulate on which economic theory has been based: rational behavior in general and rational expectations in particular."
This is a powerful statement indeed. It immediately follows that the future of humankind is not only unknown, or too difficult to predict, but unknowable, because self-awareness and attempts at prediction influence events and change the course of history.This line of reasoning has more immediate application in the financial markets. The widely accepted "efficient market theory" postulates that market participants absorb all available information in an objective and efficient manner, and new information is random and unpredictable relative to previous expectations. If any statistically significant pattern appears in the market data, it should be exploited by many players and will soon disappear. This seems to be similar to the conclusions of the "reflexivity theory". At the first glance the "reflexivity" process can improve market "efficiency" in line with the arguments of the "market fundamentalists" arguments that market processes automatically self-correct any mispricing. Yet this is not what typically happens according to Soros (and his experience and investment track record suggests that his arguments should be taken very seriously). Instead of self-correcting towards the equilibrium, which characterizes many physical phenomena (such as, for example, most types of wave motion), markets form self-reinforcing tendency which moves further away from the equilibrium. This tendency, eventually turning out wrong ("fertile fallacy", and "radical fallibility" in Soros's terms) is supported by several positive-feedback mechanisms.
G. Soros believes that development of the "reflexivity" and "fallibility" concepts should have as profound effect on the thinking of society and historical process, as the Enlightenment and ideas born with French and American revolutions. "It is high time to subject reason, as construed by Enlightenment, to the same kind of critical examination that the Enlightenment inflicted on the dominant external authorities, both divine and temporal. We have now lived in the age of reason for the past two hundred years - long enough to discover that reason has its limitations. We are ready to enter the age Fallibility. The results may be equally exhilarating and, having learned from past experience, we may be able to avoid some of the excesses characteristic of the dawning of a new age."
The remainder of the book deals mainly with the application of these ideas to the current moment in history and the author's vision for the global financial and political structure. This is not an easy task, and the author soon begins to fail his own recipe and the paradigm underlying this vision. To his credit, he never fails to recognize his own fallibility. He speaks at length, and very frankly, about his own investment mistakes and failed predictions. This provides a refreshing contrast with many others who prefer to ignore their failures, or, when they are too evident, spend many pages trying to justify or attribute them to some extraneous factors.
He begins to miss his beat when speaking about the global financial and political architecture. After presenting sharp, well-argued criticism of the present state of the world, his recipes for improvement look disappointingly weak. Essentially it's all about "kinder, gentler" IMF, WB, NATO and other such institutions. His definition of the "Open Society"(that is, the one based on ideas similar to "reflexivity" and "fallibility") eventually looks like nothing more than touched-up version of any liberal democracy today. It is contrasted with "closed societies", based on authoritarian or nationalistic ideas. Well, throughout the human history the strongest military and economic powers always viewed themselves if not perfect, as the only models truly capable of improvement and progress. Every colonial conquest, no matter how destructive and brutal, was based on the ideological support of "bringing civilization to the barbarians" in one or another form. The "Open Society Alliance" proposed by Soros, doesn't look too different from yet another reincarnation of such ideological foundation.
In the model of financial bubbles, which the author described as an application of the "reflexivity theory", the unsustainable booms happen not because skeptical views during the bubble build-up are suppressed by some official censorship, but because even in the presence of critical dissent, the prevailing erroneous consensus become self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating. Similarly, the is no reason to believe that, just because of the democratic mechanisms and press freedom, the supposed "Open Society Alliance" will be free from the standard "arrogance of power". Such arrogance and delusion, which often leads to very costly political mistakes, wars or major crises, can happen not just because any other views are suppressed by censorship as in many authoritarian societies. Rather, because of artificial self-perpetuating consensus generated by and propagated through the media and political elite, while maintaining illusion of a genuine vigorous debate by endlessly pouring attention to peripheral issues.
The "fallibility" concept truly deserves serious intellectual attention. Too bad that most likely the "center" of the global system - the richest and most powerful nations - will invariable find it harder to apply these criteria to themselves, as opposed to the rest of the world.Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism Overview

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When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change Review

When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change
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When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change ReviewI bought this book because it won the Financial Times Book of the Year Award (not a top ten winner or something, #1 mind you). Historically, a reliable guide (e.g., the masterpiece China Shakes the World, and theoretically dubious but highly provocative Friedman's World is Flat). It has dawned on me belatedly that advance praisers probably don't read their books. All these absolutely glowing endorsements by serious people...for a book that *clearly* isn't top notch.
T. Bojko's review may seem harsh, but it's spot-on. I can live with the ponderous writing style. I initially thought the big words concealed some new or profound thinking...but not at all.
The problems are: 1. there's almost nothing new or inspired about the "markets of tomorrow," and 2. there is nary a sliver of new, actionable advice about investing. The whole thing is a compendium of the superficial. Seeking to cut a swath a mile wide, it is everywhere one inch deep.
In regard to the first, the following are superficially summarized: global trade/capital flows (rightly footnoted to Martin Wolf, but Wolf's own columns are better on this); a cocktail of snippets on behavioral finance - called a "cocktail" - just read Shiller straightaway; some stuff on global trade and commodities, see latest Economist; a paraphrase of Taleb's colorful insights (just read Taleb directly); a woefully weak primer-not-really on securitization; a brief primer on asset classes that repeats everything I've got in a dozen other finance books; and too much material on IMF (e.g., not a single mention of Basel). I agree the topics per se are important, but most of them here are superficially derivative of other, better works.
Here are the four insights from Chapter 2: we are coming from a period of aberrations, many puzzles; too many dismissed them as noise; the inability to distinguish signal from noise is a bad thing; the adjustment caught people off guard. I'm not kidding. The blinding insight is: take care to distinguish signal from noise! Noise bad, signal good....
Strangest of all, in my opinion, is that the author appears to have nothing to add to the field of risk management, which stuns me given his unique vantage point. Risk management is reduced to a few catchphrases: tail risk, moral hazard, principal-agent. Say it ain't so...
Finally, T. Bojko is right about the mundane asset allocation plan: "the author just lays out a pretty mundane asset allocation plan (which is available for free on any number of websites) and then fills a couple dozen pages with worthless blather. Seriously, that's it." That's exactly right.
The book boils down to: big "structural" change is coming, try to sort signal from noise, here's pointers to a bunch of good reading material, I worked at the IMF, start with this generic plan.
I saved you a few bucks. More to the point, I wasted my time reading this book so you don't have to. Since that time is lost to me forever, the least you can do is vote my review "helpful."When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change Overview

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